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For a democracy to function properly, its citizens need to be informed. In order to raise how informed
people are and to increase democratic accountability, the US has implemented performance
accountability measures for public and private goods and services. In new research, John B.
Holbein examines the effects of the No Child Left Behind policy, which gives citizens information
about school performance. He finds that when schools fail not only does voter turnout in school
board elections increase, but the number of parents – especially the affluent – exiting increases.   
Information is necessary for democracy to function properly. When citizens are informed, they are
more likely to hold elected officials to account; when they are not, they are less likely to do so. Unfortunately, in
many democracies, the predominant majority of citizens are strikingly uninformed about government, politics, and
the performance of public institutions. Perhaps even more troubling, citizens’ levels of political information are
unequally distributed—with advantaged citizens being much more informed than their disadvantaged counterparts.
Recently, a set of public policies have tried to address this problem. Performance accountability systems provide
information to the public about the quality of various goods and services. For example, several performance
accountability systems have begun to publicize report cards on the performance of individual politicians, provide
letter grades on restaurant cleanliness, or publish the performance of public services in health, transportation, and
education, to name a few. The hope is that in so doing, these reforms will spark democratic accountability—
stimulating citizens to voice their displeasure and exit (i.e. voting with their feet) when performance deteriorates.
One of the most prominent performance accountability systems is the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) .
Along with implementing a well-known system of standardized testing, this seminal education policy provided
citizens with clear information signals about which public schools were “failing” to make adequate academic
progress. As with other performance systems, these school failure signals were designed to provide citizens with the
information necessary to help them hold local public officials accountable.
Did NCLB succeed in doing so? Do citizens respond when they receive a signal that their school has failed? If so,
how do they respond—by voicing their displeasure in local school board elections or by simply exiting failing
schools? And, who is most likely to respond to such performance signals—advantaged citizens who are already
likely to engage in schools and in politics or disadvantaged citizens who are not?
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To answer these questions, in my new research I bring together a number of big data sources that pair the
performance of public schools with data on the level of voter turnout in school board elections, the competitiveness
of school board elections, and the number and type of parents’ leaving local schools. To estimate the causal effect of
school failure signals on these outcomes, I leverage a natural experiment and a regression discontinuity design that
compares schools close to NCLB’s arbitrary cutoff distinguishing failing schools from passing schools.
My results suggest that citizens do, indeed, respond when schools fail. School failure leads to a noticeable increase
in voter turnout in school board elections, with these local races becoming more competitive as a result. Moreover,
school failure signals increase the number of parents who exit failing schools.
The figures below show these changes. They compare schools (points on the graph, with bolded points being
averages along the x-axis) that marginally failed (the group on the right of the dashed line) to schools that marginally
passed (the group on the left). The first panel plots voter turnout in school board elections on the y-axis, while the
second panel plots the number of exits from schools on the y-axis. In both, the x-axis displays how close a school
was to failing to make NCLB’s standards. Both graphs also plot various ways to specify the regression discontinuity
models (the plotted lines).
Figure 1 – Voter turnout in school board elections by school performance
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Figure 2 – School exits by school performance
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As shown in the figures, there is a jump in school board turnout and the number of parent exits from failing schools
at the school failure cutoff (the right side of the graph). Simply put, these figures show that when schools fail, citizens
respond—both by using voice to express their displeasure and also by exiting failing schools.
Unfortunately, these responses are not universal. Citizens who are white, affluent, and have voted recently are much
more likely to respond to school performance signals than minority, disadvantaged, or low-turnout individuals. This
troubling pattern is especially present with parents’ exit patterns. My results show that NCLB’s school failure signals
encourage advantaged parents to flee low-performing schools, leaving lower performing students behind.
These results highlight that performance accountability systems, like NCLB, may be a double-edged sword.
Although these provide citizens with valuable information about the performance of local public institutions, the
signals these reforms provide exacerbate fundamental inequalities in citizen engagement and in school
composition.
Though NCLB was recently rewritten, the central components of measuring and publishing school performance
remain in place. Moreover, performance accountability systems in other sectors continue to spread. My work
suggests that performance accountability systems may struggle to achieve their objective of stimulating democratic
accountability among disadvantaged communities. Thus, policy-makers should proceed with care—performance
accountability systems may spur local accountability among some, but leave many citizens perpetually behind.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Left Behind? Citizen Responsiveness to Government Performance Information’ in
the American Political Science Review.
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